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LINKING POLICIES FOR BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION WITH 
ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 
 
 
Abstract 
Global biodiversity loss and its consequences for human welfare and sustainable 
development have become major concerns.  Economists have, therefore, given 
increasing attention to the policy issues involved in the management of genetic 
resources.  To do so, they often apply empirical methods developed in behavioral and 
experimental economics to estimate economic values placed on genetic resources.  This 
trend away from almost exclusive dependence on axiomatic methods is welcomed.  
However, major valuation methods used in behavioral economics raise new scientific 
challenges. Possibly the most important of these include deficiencies in the knowledge 
of the public (and researchers) about genetic resources, implications for the formation of 
values of supplying information to focal individuals, and limits to rationality. 
 
These issues are explored for stated-preference techniques of valuation (e.g., contingent 
valuation) as well as revealed preference techniques, especially the travel cost method.  
They are illustrated by Australian and Asian examples.  Taking into account behavioral 
and psychological models and empirical evidence, particular attention is given to how 
elicitation of preferences, and supply of information to individuals, influences their 
preferences about biodiversity. Policy consequences are outlined.   
 
Keywords: Biodiversity, behavioral economics, contingent valuation, experimental 
economics, travel cost method. 
LINKING POLICIES FOR BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION WITH 
ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 
 
1.   Introduction 
If one interprets the field of behavioral economics in a broad way, its development and 
application to environmental economics in the last 50 years or so has been remarkable, 
and the increasing interest of economists in the conservation of nature and biodiversity 
has also stimulated the development of behavioral economics. There are varied 
definitions of behavioral economics and Earl (1988, p. 1) states that exactly what it is is 
unclear. However, for the purposes of this essay, the following general definitions will 
suffice. Behavioral economics applies to ‘scientific research on human and social 
cognitive biases [and processes] to better understand economic decisions, and is 
primarily concerned with rationality or lack thereof’ (Wikipedia, 2005). A second 
conception of behavioral economics is that it ‘uses facts, models and methods from 
neighboring sciences [such as psychology] to establish descriptively accurate findings 
about human cognitive ability and social interaction, and to explore the implications of 
these findings for economic behavior’ (Fehr et al., 2004, p. 391). 
Increasingly, behavioral economics has become more closely associated with 
experimental economics and empirical (observational) study of human decisions (cf. 
Sent, 2002, p. 287). Thus it contrasts with the strong emphasis of neoclassical methods 
on the use of deductive or axiomatic methods for predicting economic choice and 
behavior based on the concept of rational economic man. Furthermore, behavioral 
economics gives much more attention to the processes involved in economic decision-
making than does neoclassical economic theory. Nevertheless, the neoclassical 
economic model can be regarded as a special or particular model in behavioral 
economics. This accords with the view, for example, of Camerer (1999, p. 10) that 
behavioral economics should include ‘the rational principle as a mathematical special 
case’. Recent research in behavioral economics illustrates ways in which the 
neoclassical model is a special case, and/or at variance with actual human behaviors in 
several important respects. It is claimed, by many practitioners of behavioral economics, 
that these divergences are regular and are often of policy significance (e.g., Camerer, 
1999). 
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If dependence on empirical observation of stated preferences and choices is regarded 
as a key feature of behavioral economics, experimental economics can be regarded as a 
subset of it. Environmental economics has displayed increasing emphasis on behavioral 
economics since the 1950s. Growing interest in nature conservation and in the demand 
for maintaining biodiversity has reinforced this trend. 
This article is developed as follows. Some background information is provided on 
biodiversity loss and about the development generally of economic methods for 
assessing biodiversity loss and environmental change. New behavioral issues arising 
from the economic assessment of biodiversity loss are identified. The relevance of these 
for stated preference methods and for revealed preference methods is discussed and is 
illustrated by Australian and Asian examples. Policy implications of the analysis are 
canvassed before concluding. 
 
2.   Background: Biodiversity Loss and Economic Evaluation  
Biodiversity loss is a major environmental concern and there are several reasons for 
this. The magnitude of the loss is large and is occurring mainly for anthropogenic 
reasons connected with economic growth. While there is uncertainty about the exact 
rate of species loss, natural scientists agree that the net loss is well in excess of normal 
background rates of extinction (Ehrlich and Wilson, 1991; Smith et al., 1993; Hughes et 
al., 1997; Balmford et al., 2002) and the rate of extinctions globally appears to be 
increasing (Smith et al., 1993). While Dietz and Adger (2003) came to the conclusion 
that higher income countries expend more effort than lower income countries on 
biodiversity conservation, they find that this extra effort only partially decelerates 
biodiversity decline. Overall, the prospects of halting biodiversity decline in the 
foreseeable future seem to be bleak. The decline not only includes wild species but also 
varieties of many domesticated animals used for productive purposes, such as livestock 
(Tisdell, 2003), and varieties of plants used for production. 
This loss results in a diminution in natural capital and threatens the long-term 
sustainability of economic production. Material production based on the use of 
biological resources is threatened. In addition, to the extent that biodiversity adds to 
human satisfaction via the enjoyment of variety, novelty and intangible values, 
biodiversity loss impoverishes humankind. Furthermore, apart from any anthropocentric 
advantages from biodiversity conservation, there are ethical concerns, such as the view 
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that humankind has an ethical duty to help sustain biodiversity (Leopold, 1966; 
Passmore, 1974; Sagoff, 1996). For some individuals, this is a Kantian categorical 
imperative (Kant, 1959). 
Starting in the 1950s and early 1960s, economists began to develop techniques that 
eventually became their main instruments for evaluating potential losses in biodiversity. 
These included revealed preference methods, such as the travel cost method (Trice and 
Wood, 1958; Clawson, 1959; Knetsch, 1963; Clawson and Knetsch, 1966), and stated 
preference methods, such as the contingent valuation method (Davis, 1964). All were 
anthropocentric, assumed utility maximization and generally assumed the applicability 
of neoclassical economics. However, these methods also require the observation of 
actual human behavior and the examination of the actual statements of individuals about 
their preferences. Thus, their evolution contributed to the development of behavioral 
economics, especially since some limitations and anomalies in the neoclassical 
approach were soon revealed as a result of the application of these methods (e.g., 
Knetsch, 1989). 
Stated preference and revealed preference valuations are widely used by 
environmental economists in social cost-benefit analysis (SCBA) to assess the 
desirability, or otherwise, of biodiversity change. However, these assessments have 
mostly been restricted to the margins of the problem of conserving biodiversity because 
they have usually been based on partial analysis. For example, SCBA has mostly been 
used to assess the desirability of conserving a particular species (or at most, a small 
group of species) or particular land areas, the preservation of which would contribute to 
the maintenance of biodiversity, other things equal. This restricted analysis is partly a 
consequence of the limitations of the available economic techniques. However, it may 
also implicitly recognize the limited capacities (bounded rationality) of individuals to 
evaluate possibilities. Furthermore, there are well-canvassed limitations to SCBA as a 
mechanism for social choice (Hanley, 1992). Moreover, the accurate elicitation or 
determination of values using stated and revealed preferences faces many well-known 
obstacles (Carson et al., 2001; Venkatachalam, 2004). Nevertheless, economic studies 
of biodiversity conservation have increased our knowledge of this subject and have 
added to our awareness of its economic importance. 
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3.   Basic Behavioral Issues 
Early approaches to evaluating the economic desirability of environmental change 
continued to rely heavily on the individualistic rationality assumptions of neoclassical 
economics, and vestiges of this path dependence continue. Such evolutionary path 
dependence is not surprising. However, neoclassical economics was primarily 
concerned with providing an abstract theory of how markets for private goods work. It 
adopted an atomistic reductionist approach (see Miller and Rees, 2000, p. 6-7) using the 
notion of ideal or representative types of consumers and producers and ignores 
biophysical conditions. Variations in human behavior and knowledge were ignored and 
economic preferences and decisions were assumed to be free of any complicating social 
influences. For private goods in a near-stationary world, this probably was a useful 
abstraction and undoubtedly neoclassical theory provided valuable insights into the way 
markets operate. However, in a world of significant change and one in which public 
goods and mixed goods are important, neoclassical economics is of reduced relevance. 
This is especially so because neoclassical economics pays no significant attention to the 
processes involved in preference formation and in decision-making. Because public 
goods, mixed goods, and uncertainty are so frequently encountered in the valuation of 
biodiversity changes, this limits the scope for applying the absolute rationality 
assumptions of neoclassical economics. 
In evaluating attitudes to biodiversity loss and in using SCBA, the features listed 
below occur. These considerations are not allowed for in neoclassical economics but it 
is desirable to allow for them in evaluating preferences about biodiversity. 
 
(i) Individuals often lack knowledge of or have limited knowledge of species, the 
payoffs from their conservation, and the effectiveness of strategies to conserve 
them. This knowledge varies widely between individuals and for species. For 
example, when a sample of 204 members of the Brisbane public were asked to rate 
their knowledge of ten Australian wild mammals (Tisdell and Wilson, 2004) on a 
scale of no knowledge, poor, good, and very good knowledge, the results shown in 
Table 1 emerged. 
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Table 1. Percentage of a sample of 204 members of the Brisbane public indicating no 
knowledge or poor knowledge of the Australian mammal species listed 
Species 
(Common and scientific name) Not known 
Known but 
knowledge is poor 
Not known or poor 
knowledge of species 
  (2) (3) (2 + 3) 
Koala  
(Phascolarctos cinereus) 1.5 18.6 20.1 
Red kangaroo  
(Macropus rufus) 5.9 31.4 37.3 
Dugong  
(Dugong dugon) 10.3 38.7 49 
Northern hairy- nosed wombat 
(Lasiorhinus krefftii) 12.7 47.5 60.3 
Tree kangaroo  
(Dendrolagus lumholtzi) 26 49 75 
Northern quoll  
(Dasyurus hallucatus) 43.1 39.7 82.8 
Mahogany glider  
(Petaurus gracilis) 48.5 37.3 85.8 
Northern bettong  
(Bettongia tropica) 65.2 29.4 94.6 
Eastern pebble-mound mouse 
(Pseudomys patrius) 88.7 5.9 94.6 
Source: Author’s primary data 
 
(ii) For species, and for environments, such as natural areas, about which individuals 
have no knowledge or restricted knowledge, their preferences may not be defined, or 
may be poorly defined. These goods possess many of the qualities of experiential 
goods. This has led Spash (2002) to suggest that information provision may not be 
merely informative but preference forming.  
(iii) Bounded rationality (Simon, 1957) may limit the ability and willingness of 
individuals to specify their preferences completely. This is consistent with the 
theories of Thaler (1999). 
(iv) Attempts by researchers to elicit preferences can alter an individual’s stated 
preferences due to the interaction effect and the limited attention span of the 
individuals being questioned or observed. This is similar to the Heisenberg effect in 
physics (Heisenberg, 1930). Tisdell (1968, p.5, note 6) mentions its possible 
relevance to the economics of decision-making. 
(v) Increased knowledge and experience often systematically alter valuations of or 
preferences for commodities. The dynamics of preference variation resulting from 
such changes is behaviorally important. 
(vi) Social influences on values can be important. This includes the type of moral 
dimensions mentioned by Etzioni (1988) and bandwagon effects. For example, 53 
percent of individuals in a sample of 204 members of the Brisbane public said they 
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would increase their support for the conservation of tree kangaroos if others did 
likewise (Tisdell and Wilson, 2004, p. 2348). 
(vii) The actual observed preferences of individuals and their behavior may be 
inconsistent with those predicted by neoclassical economics theory. This has, for 
example, been highlighted by the endowment effect (Knetsch, 1989; Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1991; Kahneman et al., 1991) and by prospect theory (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979). 
(viii) Observed behavior is not necessarily informed behavior and, therefore, need not 
reflect an individual’s ‘true’ preference for a commodity. This limits the usefulness 
of revealed preference techniques, such as the travel cost method, for economic 
valuation of biodiversity change. 
(ix) In applying SCBA to decisions about nature conservation, researchers should be 
guided by the goal of optimally imperfect decision-making along the lines suggested 
by Baumol and Quandt (1964). SCBA should only be refined up to the point where 
the extra anticipated benefit from this equals its extra anticipated cost. 
 
The above issues will now be considered in relation to stated preferences, revealed 
preferences, and implications for conservation policy will be examined. They will be 
illustrated by recent research results. 
 
4.   Stated Preferences, especially Contingent Valuation, and Biodiversity 
Conservation 
In assessing stated preference approaches to eliciting preferences, I shall concentrate on 
the contingent valuation method (CVM), but some of the points raised also apply to 
other stated preference methods. It is not intended to recapitulate standard lists of 
limitations of CVM (Carson et al., 2001; Venkatachalam, 2004) but rather to 
concentrate on features that have received less emphasis. 
In view of the limited capacity of individuals to consider a large set of possibilities 
simultaneously, the process of asking individuals to state their preference for a 
particular object may focus their concentration on the object being evaluated and reduce 
their concentration on alternative objects. Compared to the situation prior to elicitation, 
this is likely to alter the individuals’ stated contingent valuation of the object to be 
valued, probably elevating it if the object is considered to be desirable and depressing it 
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if the object is believed to be undesirable. If this effect is present, it means that the 
individual’s prior value is unobservable. Therefore, a Heisenberg effect is present. The 
size of this effect is likely to be unknown, and may not be discoverable. 
The provision of information about an object, e.g., a species (cf. Samples et al., 
1986), and experience with the object alters individuals’ stated valuations of it. 
Particularly when the object is not well known, variations in these values can be 
substantial. For example, consider an experiment involving 204 members of the public 
in Brisbane, in which participants were asked to state how much as a one-off payment 
they would be prepared to pay to help conserve the mahogany glider, Petauris gracilis 
(Tisdell et al., 2005). They stated, prior to being given any information about the 
mahogany glider that they were prepared to pay AUD24.49, on average, to help 
conserve it. After they attended a lecture which dealt mainly with the mahogany glider 
and were able to read a booklet giving information about the mahogany glider and other 
focal species, their stated willingness to pay (WTP) rose, on average, to AUD35.67, that 
is by 43 per cent. 
A WTP-path like that shown in Figure 1 might be present in cases like this assuming 
that stated preferences are elicited at t1 and t2 and that information provision about the 
species (object) to be valued is provided between t1 and t2. AB represents the assumed 
but unobserved WTP value given a stationary world prior to elicitation of WTP at t1. BC 
is the assumed (but unobservable) Heisenberg-effect. The path between t1 and t2 is 
unknown but will depend on how and when information is distributed and absorbed. 
Elicitation of the WTP-value at t2 may also result in a Heisenberg effect. It is 
hypothetically indicated by DF. Without any further stimulus and under relatively 
stationary conditions, the WTP-values may decay and follow a path like FEG. How 
long this will take and whether the WTP-value will eventually return to 0A (or the 
observed value at C), or remain above it, would be a matter for empirical investigation. 
The theory, however, indicates that a unique WTP-value may not exist even under 
relatively stationary conditions. 
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Fig. 1. Illustration of the Heisenberg-effect and dynamic influences on WTP for 
conservation of a species. 
 
In the case illustrated by Figure 1, information provision about the species is shown 
as elevating WTP for its conservation. However, if the species has negative attributes, 
information provision could result in depression of WTP. The diagram can be redrawn 
to cover this case. 
The presence of this dynamic valuation phenomenon raises the question of what is 
the appropriate WTP value to use in SCBA in deciding on the desirability of action to 
conserve a species. This will be discussed in the policy section. 
Note that stated WTP for schemes to conserve a species does not represent the 
economic value of a species (Bandara and Tisdell, 2005). This is because this WTP 
depends on several factors such as the likeability of the species, its degree of 
endangerment (see Samples et al. (1986) and Tkac (1998)), and therefore whether and 
to what extent specific actions are required to conserve it, and moral considerations 
(Kotchen and Reiling, 2000). The consumptive usefulness of a species to humans may 
also have some influence on WTP (Serpell, 2004). Thus, for a species that is highly 
liked, such as the red kangaroo in Australia, but which is also abundant and not 
threatened, the willingness of individuals to contribute to schemes for its conservation is 
low but is likely to become high if the red kangaroo were to become endangered 
(Tisdell and Wilson, 2004). 
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Bandara and Tisdell (2005) found that the willingness of a sample of Sri Lankans to 
contribute funds to a project to conserve the Asian elephant was influenced by its 
apparent degree of endangerment. The willingness of the sample of Sri Lankans to 
donate funds had the form indicated by ABCDF in Figure 2, where x represents the 
assumed population level of the Asian elephant, and x1 corresponds to the current 
elephant population. The branch ABC of the relationship is strictly convex and steeper 
than the branch CDF which is strictly concave. 
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$ 
 
Fig. 2. Willingness to contribute funds for conservation of the Asian elephant based 
on amounts stated by a sample of Sri Lankans. 
 
Note that the economic value of conserving the Asian elephant for this set of persons 
must exceed OL. For example, it must at least be equal to OM. 
The question arises of whether and to what extent these results are consistent with 
the endowment effect and with prospect theory (Kahneman et al., 1991; Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979). WTP seems to be ‘anchored’ at the current population of elephants, that 
is the status quo. However, the Asian elephant is classified as endangered at current 
population levels (Asian Elephant Group, 1996). Further reduction in its populations 
will significantly raise the probability of its extinction. Avoidance of the extinction 
possibility could determine the left-hand branch of the function illustrated in Figure 2 
rather than the endowment or prospect relationship, although both influences could be 
present. 
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If only the endowment or prospect relationship applied, then the left hand branch of 
the curve in Figure 2 would be much steeper than its right hand branch (as here), but it 
would be strictly concave not strictly convex. 
Nevertheless, if the population of a species is secure, the endowment or prospect 
effect, but not the endangerment effect, may occur for a range of a focal species’ 
population. For example, suppose that the population level of a focal species is at a 
secure level x1 but will be endangered if it falls x0 or less. Then the relationship 
illustrated in Figure 3 may occur. This supposes that the prospect or endowment 
relationship applies for a decline in the species population until the species population 
level falls to x0, and then for further falls, action to avoid extinction of the species 
dominates. Therefore, between x0 and x1, the curve of the willingness to contribute 
funds for conservation of the species is concave but below x0 it is convex. 
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Fig. 3. Hypothetical willingness to contribute funds to a conservation scheme to 
prevent a reduction in the current population of a focal species or to secure an 
increase in this level allowing for the endowment effect and prospect theory. 
 
The WTP function shown in Figures 2 and 3 may turn downwards for declining 
populations of a species when its population reaches very low levels, and also could do 
this for increasing populations when its population reaches very high levels. In the first 
case, this would reflect the low likelihood of saving the species when its population is at 
precariously low levels. In addition, increasing lack of familiarity with such a rare 
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species could reduce public support for it (Tisdell and Wilson, 2002) when its 
population level is very low. On the other hand, the public’s support for a conserving a 
species in high numbers may fall with its increasing population because it becomes a 
‘pest’. 
Nevertheless, several interesting phenomena have been observed in relation to the 
above situation. DeKay and McClelland (1996) have found experimentally that many 
individuals are willing to contribute funds for conserving a species when there is little or 
no prospect of its survival. This indicates the presence of a morally inspired act because 
the action is not effective (or is highly unlikely to be effective) in saving the species. 
Such actions are not uncommon. For example, individuals are known to try to save 
others from disaster knowing that both they and persons in peril will perish, or almost 
certainly will do so. 
My joint studies have found that some members of the public are prepared to donate 
conservation funds for a secure and abundant species such as the red kangaroo (Tisdell 
and Wilson, 2004), and even for disliked (but secure) species such as the taipan snake 
(Tisdell, Wilson and Swarna Nantha, 2004). This may appear to be irrational. However, 
such actions are often a form of moral signaling. For example, many individuals, when 
asked to state their reasons for their allocations to the various species considered for 
conservation funding, mentioned that all species have a right to exist – a moral position. 
However, some also mentioned that all species have an ecological role, for example the 
taipan snake, and this could be interpreted as the signaling of a utilitarian position. Of 
course, a mixture of these motives could be present. 
 
5.   Revealed Preference and Biodiversity Conservation 
There seems to be a widespread view that, since revealed preferences are based on 
observed behavior, they are likely to be more accurate indicators of individuals’ actual 
preferences than stated preferences. However, the scope for using revealed preference 
methods is restricted because markets are often absent or incomplete, as in the case of 
pure public goods and mixed goods, and suitable surrogate markets do not always exist. 
In such cases, stated preference methods remain an essential means for gathering 
information about demand for these types of goods, such as the demand for nature 
conservation and biodiversity, although revealed preference methods can play a 
supplementary role in their economic evaluation. However, revealed preference 
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methods are based on assumptions about human behavior. These are essential to 
interpret the behavior observed, and often they are the same behavioral assumptions as 
those that underpin neoclassical economic analysis.  
Take the travel cost method, for example. It assumes that individuals are well 
informed about the economic choices available to them and are utility maximizers. This 
also implies that they are well informed about sites that they may visit. While this may 
be reasonable for sites previously visited by recreationists, many sites, such as national 
parks in remote areas, are poorly known to many visitors and can be regarded as 
experiential goods. In some cases, the majority of visitors will only visit these places 
once in their lifetime. 
In my study of a sample of 451 visitors to the Jourama Falls section of Paluma 
National Park in Northern Queensland between Townsville and Cairns, 69% of the 
sample reported that they had not previously visited it. Considering that about 32% of 
these visitors were from overseas, this is not surprising. 
The sampled visitors were asked how they would rate their knowledge of this site 
(Jourama Falls) before leaving on their visit to Jourama Falls. They could answer on a 
scale – excellent, very good, good, poor and non-existent. More than half (52.1%) said 
that their knowledge was poor (25.7%) or non-existent (28.4%). Approximately 27.4% 
of respondents said that they visited the site almost by chance or that chance was an 
important element in their decision to visit it. In addition, 27.3% of respondents reported 
that they spend little or no time in gathering information about tourist places and 
attractions to visit when they are on holidays in a region, 52.3% reported spending a 
moderate amount of time on this, and 7.8% reported spending a lot of time. Therefore, 
visitors to sites, such as Jourama Falls, appear to vary considerably in how well they are 
informed prior to their visits. In the case of Jourama Falls, the assumption of the travel 
cost method that visitors are well informed is violated because more than half the 
visitors were uninformed or little informed about the site prior their visit. This may be 
common for protected and similar areas that most individuals visit only once in their 
lifetime, or rarely and only at different stages of their lifetime. 
 
6.   Policy Discussion 
Attempts to elicit willingness to pay for the conservation of species or natural areas 
using stated preference methods encounter difficulties due to the Heisenberg 
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observational effect, and the dynamic influences of information provision (and 
experience). This can result in significantly different WTP values when measured at 
different points in time, even when general conditions are stationary. It can therefore be 
difficult to decide on the appropriate WTP value to use for policy purposes. In Figure 2, 
for example, is the value corresponding to C, F, E, G or another value appropriate? 
Fortunately, optimal social policy choice does always require perfection in 
evaluation. In fact, perfection is sometimes irrational. For example, the net social 
benefit of conserving some species may be positive for the lowest of their relevant 
observed WTP values, or even for lower ones. This may also occur for an over-estimate 
of actual costs; that is an upper bound estimate of costs. This was found to be so, for 
example, in assessing the social desirability of setting aside a sufficient area of habitat 
to conserve the mahogany glider, Petauris gracilis (Tisdell et al., 2005). Even if there 
was some limited elevation in stated values due to the Heisenberg effect, optimal social 
policy in this case using SCBA would still be to set aside sufficient habitat to conserve 
the mahogany glider. The exact limits to the variation in values consistent with the 
optimality of a particular choice can be checked mathematically. 
Generally speaking, the optimal formulation of public policy from a rationality 
viewpoint requires economy in the collection of information. If information collection 
involves use of resources, no more information should be collected than the minimum 
required to solve the problem at hand. The Baumol-Quandt principle should be applied 
to policy determination, including the formulation of policies for biodiversity 
conservation (Baumol and Quandt, 1964). This may also influence the choice of 
techniques used for determining stated preferences. For example, the single bid method 
of contingent valuation is one of the least costly techniques to apply even though it is 
claimed to be less accurate than some multiple-bid methods. But the alternatives cost 
more to use. The single bid method is also claimed to give more conservative estimates 
of values than its alternatives (Bishop and Heberlein, 1990). Therefore, if a species is 
found to be worthwhile conserving using single bid values, it will also be so for more 
accurate but costly value estimates.  
In economics, we need to give more attention to detailing and using optimally 
imperfect methods for policy formulation. At the same time, we should be clear in 
valuation analysis about what is being evaluated. 
For example, the economic value of keeping a species in existence is usually not 
indicated by the willingness of individuals to donate funds for schemes to conserve it. 
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Normally, such values will underestimate the economic value of keeping the species in 
existence (other things constant), and the underestimation will tend to be greater the 
more secure (abundant) is the species’ population. Nevertheless, the results are policy-
relevant because they measure the level of public support for the conservation policy 
being proposed. 
Apart from the above relationship, in which WTP reflects the urgency of 
conservation action as well as likeability of a focal species, stated values may reflect 
moral signaling (Kotchen and Reiling, 2000). That raises the question of how 
governments should deal with the moral signaling element. For example, if there is 
widespread support for trying to save a doomed species, should the government 
nevertheless spend money on its conservation? To do so would be politically popular 
but ineffective in saving the species. 
Again, when using revealed preference approaches to determine the lower bounds of 
the economic value of natural areas, care is required to ensure that the fundamental 
assumptions underlying these approaches are satisfied, or at least approximately 
satisfied. In particular, greater care should be taken in using the travel cost method to 
evaluate such areas. Use of the method can be reasonable when a high proportion of 
visitors to a site are repeat visitors but seems doubtful when the majority of visitors to a 
site are first-time visitors. In the latter case, many of the visitors are likely to be poorly 
informed or uninformed about the attraction. Consequently, the method may work well 
for outdoor sites in an urban periphery with many repeat visitors but could be of limited 
value for economic assessment of natural areas in remote regions where the majority of 
visitors are one-time visitors from distant places. 
 
7.   Concluding Comments 
Advances in behavioral economics (based on experiments and purposive observation) 
have shown that human decision-making is much more complex than envisaged in the 
neoclassical paradigm of economic man. This is mainly because neoclassical economics 
does not give much attention to human cognition and the bounded rationality of 
humankind. While the neoclassical approach has been able to provide valuable insights 
into the way that markets work if conditions change slowly, and into the economic 
valuations of private goods, it appears to be less useful for valuing public goods and 
mixed goods, such as those associated with biodiversity conservation. However, as 
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demonstrated in this paper, behavioral economics is providing challenging new insights 
into economic valuation and policy formulation. Its emphasis on the study of human 
cognition and bounded rationality has helped to advance knowledge. Moreover, 
behavioral economists do not rule out the possibility that some regularly observed 
human behavior is not rational at all, that the degree of conscious or rational choice 
varies between individuals, and that the degree of rationality exhibited by the same 
individual changes depending on circumstances and the object being considered. All of 
these factors can be policy-relevant. 
Nevertheless, behavioral economics has not yet fully dealt with these issues even 
though it has identified types of economic behaviors (‘anomalies’) not predicted by 
neoclassical economic theory. It might be fruitful for it to give more attention to the 
dynamics of cognitive processes (e.g., of the type illustrated by Figure 1) than in the 
past. These processes have significant effects on the public’s valuation of public and 
mixed goods, such as those involving the conservation of biodiversity, nature, and 
heritage commodities.  
 
8.   Acknowledgements 
Research for this paper was partly supported by an ARC Discovery Grant for the study 
of the economics of conserving Australian topical wildlife. I wish to thank Hemanath 
Swarna Nantha for research assistance and the organizers of the SERC 2005 for inviting 
me to prepare and present this paper. 
 
References 
Asian Elephant Group (1996), Elephas maximus. In IUCN (2004) 2004 IUCN Red List 
of Threatened Species. Available from: http://www.redlist.org [accessed 7 July 
2005]. 
Balmford, A., R.E. Green and M. Jenkins (2003). Measuring the Changing State of 
Nature. TRENDS in Ecology and Evolution, 18, pp. 326-330. 
 15
Bandara, R. and C. Tisdell (2005). Changing Abundance of Elephants and Willingness 
to Pay for their Conservation. Journal of Environmental Management, 76, pp. 47-
59. 
Baumol, W.J. and R.E. Quandt (1964). Rules of Thumb and Optimally Imperfect 
Decisions. American Economic Review, 54, pp. 23-46. 
Bishop, R.C. and T.A. Heberlein (1990). The Contingent Valuation Method. In R.L. 
Johnston and G.V. Johnson (eds.) Economic Valuation of Natural Resources. 
Westview, Boulder, Colorado. 
Camerer, C. (1999). Behavioral Economics: Reunifying Psychology and Economics. 
Proceedings National Academy of Science USA, 96, pp. 10575-10577. 
Carson, R.T., N.E. Flores, and N.R. Meade (2001). Contingent Valuation: Controversies 
and Evidence. Environmental and Resource Economics, 19, pp. 173-210. 
Clawon, M. (1959). Methods of Measuring the Demand for and Value of Outdoor 
Recreation, Reprint No.10. Resources for the Future, Washington, DC. 
Clawson, M. and J. Knetsch (1966). Economics of Outdoor Recreation. The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore. 
Davis, R. (1964). The Value of Big Game Hunting in a Private Forest. Transactions of 
the Twenty-Ninth North American Wildlife Conference, pp. 303-403. 
DeKay, M.L. and G.H. McClelland (1996). Probability and Utility Components of 
Endangered Species Preservation Programs. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Applied, 2, pp. 60-83. 
Dietz, S. and W.N. Adger (2003). Economic Growth, Biodiversity Loss and 
Conservation Effort. Journal of Environmental Management, 68, pp. 23-35. 
Earl, P.E. (1998). Introduction. In Behavioral Economics, Vol. I. Edward Elgar, 
Aldershot, UK. 
 16
Ehrlich, P.R. and E.O. Wilson (1991). Biodiversity Studies: Sciences and Policy. 
Science, 253, pp. 758-761. 
Etzioni, A. (1988). The Moral Dimension: Toward a New Economics. Free Press, New 
York. 
Fehr, E., S. Holden and C. Schultz (2004). Editors’ Preface. Scandinavian Journal of 
Economics, 106, pp. 391-392. 
Hanley, N. (1992). Are There Environmental Limits to Cost Benefit Analysis? 
Environmental and Resource Economics, 2, pp. 33-59. 
Heisenberg, W. (1930). The Physical Principles of Quantum Theory. Translated by C. 
Eckart and F.C. Hoyt. University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
Hughes, J.B., G.C. Daily and P.R. Ehrlich (1997). Population Diversity: Its Extent and 
Extinction. Science, 278, pp. 689-692. 
Kahneman, D., J.L. Knetsch and R.H. Thaler (1991). The Endowment Effect, Loss 
Aversion, and Status Quo Bias. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5, pp. 193-206. 
Kahneman, D. and A. Tversky (1979). Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under 
Risk. Econometrica, 47, pp. 263-291. 
Kant, I. (1959). Foundations of the Metaphysics. Translated by L. Beck. Bobbs-Merril, 
Indianapolis. 
Knetsch, J.L. (1963). Outdoor Recreation Demands and Values. Land Economics, 39, 
pp. 387-396. 
Knetsch, J. L. (1989). The Endowment Effect and Evidence of Non-Reversible 
Indifference Curves. The American Economic Review, 79, pp. 1277-1284. 
Kotchen, M.J. and S.D. Reiling (2000). Environmental Attitudes, Motivation, and 
Contingent Valuation: A Case Study involving Endangered Species. Ecological 
Economics, 32, pp. 93-107. 
 17
Leopold, A. (1966). A Sand Country Almanac: with other Essays on Conservation from 
Round River. Oxford University Press, New York. 
Miller, P. and W.E. Rees (2000). Introduction. In David Pimentel, Laura Westra and 
Reed F. Noss (eds.), Ecological Integrity: Integrating Environment, Conservation, 
and Health. Island Press, Washington D.C. 
Passmore, J.A. (1974). Man’s Responsibility for Nature: Ecological Problems and 
Western Traditions. Duckworth, London. 
Sagoff, M. (1966). On the Value of Endangered and other Species. Environmental 
Management, 20, pp. 871-911. 
Samples, K.C., J.A. Dixon and M.M. Gowen (1986). Information Disclosure and 
Endangered Species Valuation. Land Economics, 62, pp. 306-312. 
Sent, E-M. (2002). Book Review of Friedel Bolle and Michael Carlberg (eds.), 
Advances in Behavioral Economics: Essays in Honor of Horst Todt. Physica-Verlag, 
Heidelberg and New York, 2001. Journal of Economic Psychology, 23, pp. 287-289. 
Serpell, J.A. (2004). Factors Influencing Human Attitudes to Animals and their Welfare. 
Animal Welfare, 13, pp. S145-151. 
Simon, H. (1957). Models of Man. John Wiley, New York. 
Smith, F.D.M., R.M. May, R. Pellow, T.H. Johnson and Walker, K.S. (1993). 
Estimating Extinction Rates. Nature, 364, pp. 292-296. 
Spash, C.L. (2002). Informing and Forming Preferences in Environmental Evaluation: 
Coral Reef Biodiversity. Journal of Economic Psychology, 23, pp. 665-687. 
Thaler, R.H. (1999). Mental Accounting Matters. Journal of Behavioral Decision 
Making, 12, pp. 183-206. 
Tisdell, C.A. (1968). The Theory of Price Uncertainty, Production and Profit. Princeton 
University Press, Princeton. 
 18
Tisdell, C.A. (2003). Socioeconomic Causes of Loss of Animal Genetic Diversity: 
Analysis and Assessment. Ecological Economics, 45, pp. 365-376. 
Tisdell, C. and C. Wilson (2002). Ecotourism for the Survival of Sea Turtles and Other 
Wildlife. Biodiversity and Conservation, 11, pp. 1521-1538. 
Tisdell, C. and C. Wilson (2004). The Public’s Knowledge and Support for 
Conservation of Australia’s Tree-Kangaroos and Other Animals. Biodiversity and 
Conservation, 13, pp. 2339-2359. 
Tisdell, C., C. Wilson and H. Swarna Nantha (2004). Comparative Public Support for 
Conserving Reptile Species is High. Economics, Ecology and the Environment 
Working Paper No.109. School of Economics, The University of Queensland, 
Brisbane 4072. 
Tisdell, C., C. Wilson and H. Swarna Nantha (2005). Policies for Saving a Rare 
Australian Glider: Economics and Ecology. Biological Conservation, 123, pp. 237-
248. 
Tkac, J. (1998). The Effects of Information on Willingness-to-Pay Values of 
Endangered Species. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 80, pp. 1214-
1220. 
Trice, A. and J. Wood (1958). Measurement of Recreation Benefits. Land Economics, 
34, pp. 195-207. 
Tversky, A. and D. Kahneman (1991). Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-
Dependent Model. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106, pp. 1039-1061. 
Venkatachalam, L. (2004). The Contingent Valuation Method: A Review. 
Environmental Impact Assessment Review, 24, pp. 89-124. 
Wikipedia (2005) Behavioral Finance. In Wikipeida, the Free Encyclopedia. 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Behavioral_economics [Accessed 20/06/05]. 
 19
PREVIOUS WORKING PAPERS IN THE SERIES 
9.   ECONOMICS, ECOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENT 
 
For a list of working papers 1-100 in this series, visit the following website: 
http://www.uq.edu.au/economics/PDF/Clem_Tisdell_WorkingPapers.pdf or see lists in papers 
101-140 
 
101. Knowledge and Willingness to Pay for the Conservation of Wildlife Species: 
Experimental Results Evaluating Australian Tropical Species, by Clem Tisdell and 
Clevo Wilson, May 2004. 
 
102. Antarctic Tourists, Wildlife and the Environment: Attractions and Reactions to 
Antarctica, by Clem Tisdell, May 2004. 
 
103. Birds in an Australian Rainforest: Their Attraction for Visitors and Visitors’ Ecological 
Impacts, by Clem Tisdell and Clevo Wilson, May 2004. 
 
104. Nature-Based Tourism and the Valuation of its Environmental Resources: Economic 
and Other Aspects by Clem Tisdell, May 2004. 
 
105. Glow Worms as a Tourist Attraction in Springbrook National Park: Visitor Attitudes 
and Economic Issues, by Clem Tisdell, Clevo Wilson and David Merritt, July 2004. 
 
106. Australian Tropical Reptile Species: Ecological Status, Public Valuation and Attitudes 
to their Conservation and Commercial Use, by Clem Tisdell, Clevo Wilson and 
Hemanath Swarna Nantha, August 2004. 
 
107. Information and Wildlife Valuation: Experiments and Policy, by Clem Tisdell and 
Clevo Wilson, August 2004. 
 
108. What are the Economic Prospects of Developing Aquaculture in Queensland to Supply 
the Low Price White Fillet Market?  Lessons from the US Channel Catfish Industry, by 
Thorbjorn Lyster and Clem Tisdell, October 2004. 
 
109. Comparative Public Support for Conserving Reptile Species is High: Australian 
Evidence and its Implications, by Clem Tisdell, Clevo Wilson and Hemanath Swarna 
Nantha, October 2004. 
110. Dependence of public support for survival of wildlife species on their likeability by 
Clem Tisdell, Clevo Wilson and Hemanath Swarna Nantha, October 2004. 
111. Dynamic Processes in Contingent Valuation: A Case Study Involving the Mahogany 
Glider by Clem Tisdell, Clevo Wilson and Hemanath Swarna Nantha, November 2004. 
112. Economics, Wildlife Tourism and Conservation: Three Case Studies by Clem Tisdell 
and Clevo Wilson, November 2004. 
113. What Role Does Knowledge of Wildlife Play in Providing Support for Species’ 
Conservation by Clevo Wilson and Clem Tisdell, December 2004. 
 
114. Public Support for Sustainable Commercial Harvesting of Wildlife: An Australian Case 
Study by Clem Tisdell, Clevo Wilson and Hemanath Swarna Nantha, December 2004. 
 
 20
115. Endangerment and Likeability of Wildlife Species: How Important are they for 
Proposed Payments for Conservation by Clem Tisdell, Hemanath Swarna Nantha and 
Clevo Wilson, December 2004. 
 
116. How Knowledge Affects Payment to Conserve and Endangered Bird by Clevo Wilson 
and Clem Tisdell, February 2005. 
 
117. Public Choice of Species for the Ark: Phylogenetic Similarity and Preferred Wildlife 
Species for Survival by Clem Tisdell, Clevo Wilson and Hemanath Swarna Nantha, 
March 2005. 
 
118. Economic Incentives for Global Conservation of Wildlife: New International Policy 
Directions by Clem Tisdell, March 2005. 
 
119. Resource Entitlements of Indigenous Minorities, Their Poverty and Conservation of 
Nature: Status of Australian Aborigines, Comparisons with India’s Tribals, Theory and 
Changing Policies Globally by Clem Tisdell, March 2005. 
 
120. Elephants and Polity in Ancient India as Exemplified by Kautilya’s Arthasastra 
(Science of Polity) by Clem Tisdell, March 2005. 
 
121. Sustainable Agriculture by Clem Tisdell, April 2005. 
 
122. Dynamic Processes in the Contingent Valuation of an Endangered Mammal Species by 
Clem Tisdell, Clevo Wilson and Hemanath Swarna Nantha, April 2005. 
 
123. Knowledge about a Species’ Conservation Status and Funding for its Preservation: 
Analysis by Clem Tisdell, June 2005. 
 
124. Public Valuation of and Attitudes towards the Conservation and Use of the Hawksbill 
Turtle: An Australian Case Study by Clem Tisdell, Hemanath Swarna Nantha and 
Clevo Wilson, June 2005. 
 
125. Comparison of Funding and Demand for the Conservation of the Charismatic Koala 
with those for the Critically Endangered Wombat Lasiorhinus krefftii by Clem Tisdell 
and Hemanath Swarna Nantha, June 2005. 
 
126. Management, Conservation and Farming of Saltwater Crocodiles: An Australian Case 
Study of Sustainable Commercial Use by Clem Tisdell and Hemanath Swarna Nantha, 
August 2005. 
 
127. Public Attitudes to the Use of Wildlife by Aboriginal Australians: Marketing of Wildlife 
and its Conservation by Clem Tisdell and Hemanath Swarna Nantha, August 2005. 
 
 21
